A Kurdish Country: How Long Can It Last?

Morton Abramowitz is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey.

The Bush administration is itching to get rid of Saddam Hussein. The Kurds, too, would like him wiped out. So, of late, Washington and the mountain warriors of northern Iraq have learned to work together. But there is a paradox in this alliance: right now, with Saddam in place, the Kurds have de facto independence; without him, their chances of staying independent are very slim.

The neighbors of de facto Kurdistan--Iran, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Syria-would be hostile, fearing its impact on their own restive Kurdish populations, challenging its borders, coveting its oil. Knowing this, Kurdish leaders are divided about what to expect from the United States. Some expect Washington to help a little, then fade away, as it did in 1975 after a Kurdish rebellion was promoted, then abandoned, by the shah and the CIA.

Still, most Kurds remain stoically optimistic. After decades of death and destruction, they are relishing their chance to govern a liberated land. And having experienced freedom, they will not again accept Iraqi military rule. In the time that they have, they are trying to create a fact that they alone want to exist.

The Iraqi Kurds have tried to improve relations with An kara, hoping to reduce Turkish misgivings. They have held free elections, seeking to win greater Western commitment to their security. For the first time, last month the U.S. secretary of state met with the main Kurdish leaders-albeit in the company of other nonKurdish Iraqi opposition figures. But for the Kurds to avert another dramatic reversal of fortune, it's not enough to be rid of Saddam. Even if he has a brutal successor the world may find it convenient to turn away from the Kurds sacrificing them in the name of stability.

Only a civilian regime would be likely to accept a high degree of Kurdish autonomy in a federal state with nominal "territorial integrity." And this could be achieved only if Washington made it clear that nothing but a civilian government committed to democracy and human rights would gain recognition. But since any such declaration would diminish Iraqi military interest in overthrowing Saddam, such a policy is improbable. And given the lack of cooperation among the Iraqi opposition and the dearth of democratic traditions, pluralism and federalism may be elusive goals.

For their part, the Kurds have to continue working with the various Shiite and other opposition groups to establish a unified and democratic Iraq, thereby demonstrating a willingness to keep the country from coming apart. A provisional government in "Free Iraq" would be the first step. At the same time, the Kurds of Iraq must shut down the insurgency by the Kurds in Turkey, the PKK, who are operating from their territory. Nothing less would ease Turkish fears. But all of this takes the leaders in the region, in Washington and the Kurds themselves into uncharted terrain.

Once the American political season is over, any U.S. administration will have to come to grips with questions bigger than whether Saddam stays or goes. It will have to decide whether it is prepared to break with the political status quo in the gulf. Are we now willing to invest in a longterm effort to create a democratic federated Iraq.? Dare we risk the disintegration of this 70-year-old amalgam cobbled together by British colonialism? Or do we simply drift back to acceptance of something like the pre-gulf-war Iraq with a new face but much the same old dictatorship? Or even with Saddam? Regional attitudes make a decision difficult, and one senses an inclination to avoid the tough choices or admit those that have been made.

Amid these uncertainties, the Iraqi Kurds would be wise to proceed cautiously and examine their aspirations. They live in an unfriendly area, and they should be wary of anyone claiming to offer them salvation, especially anyone from the West.