How To Think About China

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER RICHARD NIXON BEGAN THE "normalization" process with Mac Zedong, America's China policy has broken down. It's not hard to see why. Last year's showdown in the Taiwan Strait was powerful evidence to those who see China as a rising enemy. The 1989 crackdown at Tiananmen Square and Britain's exit from Hong Kong this month raise worries about repression. The result is a debate polarized between business interests transfixed by the potential market ofl.2 billion people and those who want trade held hostage to Chinese progress on human rights, one also between "engagers" and "containers."

The clamor flows from the fact that both the Bush and Clinton administrations, pulled by competing domestic interests, lost control of China policy. A new, more reasonable consensus is difficult to achieve, because, at bottom, Americans don't like the Chinese government. But it's not impossible: There's time to work out a long-term, bipartisan framework for dealing with China. A realistic approach might look like this:

China has dropped its international ideological pretensions. And for all its warts, from foreign arms sales to mistreatment of dissidents, it's hard not to be impressed by the possibilities for constructive change already underway as China pursues its priority of double-digit economic growth. Personal freedoms have expanded faster than anyone imagined in Nixon's day. Trying to bottle up China would be futile and counterproductive. No matter how nervous its neighbors are about the mainland's intentions toward Taiwan and otherry after Nixon met Z1 territories, they want Washington andneeds a new consens@ China to have a decent relationship. They are not interested in containing China just because U.S. politics on China are in disarray.

In the community of nations, China's economic stake grows daily, and with it China's dependence on global stability and cooperation. "Engaging" China and further extending the processes of integration, however, does not mean simply agreeing to China's demands. It means working through big issues like World Trade Organization membership. The U.S. can disagree with China on some important issues but interact with it productively on others. America should make its differences with China as multilateral as possible. The gamble is that economic development, globalization and expanded information and communications will lead to a more pluralistic, more internationalist China with which the U.S. can have increasingly normal relations.

Don't hem in the president by precluding serious dialogue, especially when differences are acute. Breaking off discussions after Tiananmen was counterproductive. Frank, high-level engagement is the best way to keep the overan relationship in focus and balance contentious issues with positive ones.

America needs alliances-particularly with Japan- and its military forces in East Asia to reinforce its credibility in dealing with Beijing. China's leaders have one foot in the 20th century economically and the other politically and strategically in the 19th century. The pace of change in China may well turn up political surprises, not all to America's liking. Beijing's authoritarianism and ham-handedness will make the relationship prickly for a long time to come. It's not yet possible to presume the good will of China's leaders if a rising China turns out to be less than benign, the vastly more powerful U.S. will have plenty of time to take countermeasures.

Taiwan is the one issue that could bring Washington and Beijing to blows. It cannot be resolved until there is fundamental political change on the mainland-not a near prospect-and it could be vastly complicated by political developments in Taiwan. The issue requires adroit and constant U.S. management. Washington must continue to uphold the diplomatic convenience that Taiwan is part of "one China" while hedging against Chinese belligerence mad urging restraint and more serious dialogue between Beijing and Taipei. This has worked for 20 years; we have no better alternative.

Establishing stable relations with china won't be easy. Unproved suspicions that China tried to interfere in the 1996 presidential elections, China's refusal to lighten up on dissidents and its supply of advanced weaponry to Paldstan and Iran overshadow America's growing trade and investment ties with Beijing, narrowing Washington's options. Those suspicious of a soft approach will harp on the negatiyes. So will growing numbers of Chinese who now believe that America is trying to "contain" them.

Such difficult times between the two countries--and far worse ones--have come and gone. They can be dangerous and costly. But too much has changed in China and East Asia, and the growing U.S.-China relationship is too promising to accept that we are inevitably doomed to hostility.